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11. INTRODUCTION
The problem of local government finance is a universal one whose 
manifestations vary from country to country. The problem is more 
significant for developing countries where the variety of 
designated functions for local authorities have not always been 
matched by.responsibility for public spending.
Due to rapid population growth there is a growing demand for 
provision of local services and employment. This is reflected in 
the growing numbers to be educated, sheltered, transported, 
treated and employed. Zimbabwe with an estimated population growth rate of 2.9% is faced with a wide range of these problems, 
in addition to the objective of restructuring the inherited 
dualist colonial economy.
In simple terms, the problem of local government finance concerns 
raising money as well as spending it; enough revenue must be 
raised to meet functions which range from provision of basic 
services to coordination and planning. It is a problem of 
resource allocation to be resolved both at the national and local 
levels.
The raising of revenue for local government includes a variety of 
central government allocations, local taxation through national 
and local legislation, borrowing and income generating 
activities. In Zimbabwe central allocations directly to local 
authorities (Districts) and through sectoral ministries, is a key 
source of revenue generation. There is an excessive degree of 
dependence on central resources which is largely a product of the 
nature of the inherited colonial economy.
Since Independence central government has stressed the importance 
of district local authorities increasing their capacities to 
generate revenue. This objective is linked to the desire to 
strengthen self-reliance and decentralization of both economic 
and political activities.
The 1984 Prime Minister's directive enshrines this desire: "To 
define the administrative structures at provincial and district 
level and the relationships and channels of communication between 
all the participants in development at provincial and district 
level in order to achieve the . co-ordinated development of 
provinces and districts of Zimbabwe."
The principal features of the directive are planning, 
participation, coordination and implementation. The role of 
finance is central to achieving these objectives and furthermore, 
this raises the key issue that the powers bestowed on local 
authorities (whether through Acts, e.g. the District Council Act 
or through directives) have to be clearly linked to the question 
of effective power of public spending. How can local authorities 
generate enough revenue to finance a wide range of development
2projects? What alternatives exist and how feasible are they 
within the given context of Zimbabwe?
Currently District Councils have been exploring a range of 
alternatives to generate local revenue. These include: new taxes 
and levies on local inhabitants; grain and product levies; rural bus . 1icences; and a general desire for tax sharing. All these alternatives sound attractive but should be carefully examined 
within the general framework of financial relations between 
central and local government.
There are also general political pre-conditions which determine 
the question of resource allocation. Political leadership at all 
levels of government, from village to national levels, is bound 
to struggle for a sufficient degree of control over an adequate 
amount of resources to maintain a power base and to be able to 
distribute expected benefits to those on whose support it 
depends. In this context, also local levels of government 
struggle hard to meet implementation of projects and programmes 
they helped to identify under the banner of grassroots 
participation in planning.
The discussion contained in this paper will attempt to highlight 
the following issues:
a) The problems of linking resposibilities and functions bestowed 
upon local authorities with the ability to generate adequate 
resources to meet them.
b) Formulation of general criteria for judging the effectiveness 
of local taxation with reference to equity, administrative 
feasibility, political acceptability and powers of sanction.
c) Analysis of post-independence experience (using current 
research). This will include both discussion of overall trends 
and as well as of some options which District Councils have 
raised for the future.
2. Financial relations between central and local government
There are many ways in which the financial relationships between 
Central Government (CG) and Local Authorities (LA's) can be 
structured. It would be difficult, if not impossible to identify 
an optimal structure. Much depends on historically evolved roles, 
actual political economic context as well as on future directions 
in the role of CG and LA's. Even though this may be the case, 
there are some general guidelines and principles with which to 
judge effectiveness of an existing CG- LA financial structure and 
proposals for changes therein.
First of all, the adequacy of fiscal resources available to LA',s 
can only be determined in relation to the responsibilities and 
functions which they have. Thus to insist that LA's have to 
undertake developmental tasks without ensuring that LA's have adequate financial means, either in the form of local taxes or
3central transfers, would be an irresponsible act of government. 
Equally it would make little sense on the part of LA's to insist on increased revenue base, without justifying this in terms of 
expenditures for which they are held responsible both by CG and 
their own communities.
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4its purpose is unclear. Also people will resist a tax- of which 
the incidence is considered highly unequal and unfair. In order 
to avoid the people's wrath, LA's have a marked preference for 
more 'covert forms' of taxation. That is to say, to levy a tax 
not directly at the taxpayer, but via other economic 
intermediairies (e.g indirect taxes). Very often there are 
administrative reasons for levying a tax. at an intermediate 
source (e.g case of petrol) rather than at each individual 
doorstep. But there are also powerful reasons related to popular 
acceptability. Another common political fact is that the rich 
resist progressive taxes and are often in a position to do so. 
The poor do not like regressive taxes but are often not aware of 
it (everybody is equal - but some more than others) and generally 
have little means tocorrect it.
e) A last point relates to sanction. We all are 'free 
riders'. That is to say we like to benefit from public goods and 
enjoy it even more when we can avoid to pay for it. For example, 
radio licence. The frequency of declared radio ownership in any 
neighbourhood will drop immediately as soon as the licence 
inspector arrives! This attitude will result in large scale tax 
evasion when there are no sanctions to 'free ridership' and to 
tax evasion. This on the grounds that "if my neighbours don't 
pay, why should I?" Necessarily this point relates to 
administrative capacity.
As already observed earlier it is unlikely that local authorities 
can stand financially on their own (2). Even though LA's in 
moments of financial desperation may do some wishful thinking in 
this direction, some reflection would soon help to conclude that this would make little sense. Even though LA's may wish it to be 
a reality, central government would certainly not appreciate 
financial independence of LA's. For many CG official separatism 
and civil chaos will result from any devolution of fiscal powers. 
While these are usually exagerated fears, anyone can see that 
central transfers can be a very convincing leverage to make sure 
that a recalcitrant LA gets back into line. This overly political view erroneously assumes that central government and . local 
authorities are each others opposites. It misses an important 
characteristic of modern government, namely that there are no 
separate (even if hierarchical) layers of government, but that 
modern economies require a SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. Not only is 
central government involved in local affairs but equally local 
authorities are engaged in the organization and provision of 
national public, services.
Education is one example. Every Zimbabwean has a right to 
education. Education is a nationally standardized public service 
and therefore a direct responsibility of the Ministry of 
Education. Local Authorities are so to say field managers. The 
Per Capita Education Grant and teacher salaries transfers enable 
them to carry out this function.
5Central allocations have another important national objective, 
namely to redress severe spatial imbalances. For natural and 
historic reasons not all districts are well endowed in poor districts have far less fiscal capacity and 
not in position to provide basic services of a same 
which every Zimbabwean is entitled.
Hence, LA s are therefore 
standard to
Central allocations can take various fo 
appropriation from the national budget 
expenditures for specific purposes. The f 
however do not go via the LA budget, but 
national accounts against which creditors 
Capita Education Grant referred to above is 
cost grant. For each child a specified 
Single-purpose grants have much in common w 
.LA's have little discretion in its use, exc 
of the expenditures. Multi-purpose grants 
somewhat greater discretion in that the cen 
used for a prescribed range of purposes.
rms. One is a vote 
LA's can incur 
inancial transactions 
funds remain within 
are paid. The Per 
an example of a unit 
cost, can be made, 
ith unit cost grants, 
ept in the execution 
are giving LA's a 
tral allocation can be
In addition to these expenditure specific votes and grants there 
are other forms of grants which are defined in terms of local 
financial position. Revenue matching grants are given in a 
Certain proportion to a specified source of local revenue. They 
intend to reward local fiscal effort. Thus ^richer' LA's can 
benefit from them more than 'poorer' LA's. Block or deficiency 
grants work in an opposite manner. Differences in fiscal capacity 
among LA's are compensated by reference to a specified standard 
of services.
In addition to votes and grants there 
important forms of central allocations, loans.
are at least two more 
namely, tax sharing and
Tax sharing is a form of 
proportion of revenue of 
for local authority use. 
specific tariff is appli 
Thus, the national tax o 
LA. Alternatively, a cer natio.nal tax is pooled a
CG allocation to 
a nationally col 
This can be don ed to the taxpaye 
ffice collects th 
tain percentage nd reserved for L
LA's, where a certain 
lected tax is reserved e in various ways. A 
r in a specified area, 
e tax on behalf of the 
of the revenues of a 
A ' s .
Tax sharing has an intu local taxes, the contin 
to collect and of pol 
avoided. In comparison 
tiresome procedures and 
grant or to have it enl 
tax often has the added 
adjustment to inflation 
however also serious di 
going to distribute the 
accordance to local co
itive appeal to 
uous headaches o 
itical resistan 
to grants one 
negotiations to 
arged. Furthermo 
advantage of 
(in case of an 
fficulties. Most 
revenue among 1 
ntribution (ass
LA s. In comparison to 
f administrative capacity 
ce to adjust rates are 
can avoid the sometimes 
apply for a particular 
re, sharing in a national 
elasticity or automatic 
ad valorem tax). There are 
importantly, how is one 
ocal authorities? If in 
uming that this can be
6accurately measured) then one may enhance inequalities among the 
various districts. If in accordance to 'need", the problem is one 
of definition of need (distributional formula).
Loans, via a specially constituted District Loan Fund are a 
practical way of financing capital ...works (e.g public services 
buildings) in the sense that the financial burden does not fall in one single financial year when the benefits of having' the 
building are reaped over a number of years. The current practice 
of capital grants has this particular drawback.
When considering the various forms of central allocations it 
makes little sense to propose one single form which maximizes per 
se either local authority's autonomy or central government's 
centralist control. As we have argued earlier, Zimbabwe needs an 
integrated system of government where local authorities and 
central government work together to provide the much needed 
public services at the highest possible standard and . at the 
lowest possible cost. The ways of LA finance depend on the 
responsibilities enthrusted to them. For example, a unit cost or 
single purpose grant is a perfectly sound way to finance 
education or road maintenance. For local regulatory tasks a block 
grant would be an adequate way of finance. For economic services a matching grant in function of business licences would be 
sensible. If one has to generalize, all what one could probably 
say is that a balanced revenue mix is needed that takes into 
account differences in fiscal capacity and that gives local 
authorities a reasonable amount of discretion to carry out their 
own responsibilities as against their national functions.
3. Post-Independence experience in financing District Councils
At Independence Zimbabwe inherited a disjointed local- government 
system, which had on one hand Urban and Rural Councils reflecting 
European economic interests, whilst on the other hand the African 
.Councils represented african interests. There was very limited 
local government for the african sector (Tribal Trust Lands), 
which was subject to strong authoritarian control by central 
government (3). The African Councils were generally small 
fragmented units whose authority was linked to Chiefs, Subchiefs 
and Headmen. The small size undermined their financial viability 
and this together with low levels of efficiency caused poor 
service provision.
The reconstituted District Councils covered (after Independence) 
the same communal lands (Tribal Trust Lands) as . the African 
Councils, but they became more linked to administrative 
districts. The District councils also became more , effectively 
' integrated with provincial and central government, and the flow 
of public sector investment to them increased. Rural development 
became a government priority and district councils were seen as 
an important vehicle to achieve rural development goals.
7However, the newly constituted district councils inherited a 
legacy of a poor resource base, which continues to afflict their 
viability as local government units, in spite of increased 
central government allocations.
,3.1 Some overall trends and comparisons
Some tentative calculations will throw some light on the 
financial situation of the district council and its predecessor.
In 1972/73 the African Councils had a local revenue base of 3.9 
min (4). With a population of 3.3 min (5), this gives a total of 
1.18 Rhodesian Dollars per person. The total of central
allocations was not much higher namely, 4.7 min. or on a per 
capita basis RH $ 1.42. Thus, the total that African Councils 
could spend for the benefit of their population was 2.60 dollars 
per person per annum. If one would express this amount in 1984 
prices so as to make it comparable to the 1984/85 District 
Councils' budgets, the amount rises to Z$ 9.10 (6). The actual
per capita district council expenditure in 1984/85 was Z$ 56.48 
(7). In other words, present day District Council expenditures 
are in real terms more than 6 times thosq. of- the African 
Councils. To a large extent this may be explained by the transfer 
and post independence expansion of education.
Even though considerable progress has been made since 
Independence, the great economic imbalances between District 
- Councils and the Rural and Urban Councils on the other, are still 
very much there. Again some figures are illustrative. In 1981/82 
the current expenditures of District Councils were on a per 
capita basis Z$ 25.60 while those for all local authorities 
together were Z$ 77.40 (8). Since the latter is an aggregate of 
all local authorities, the actual gap is more than a factor 
three. Although this gap-has been narrowed, primarily due to 
central government transfers to district Councils, there are 
still considerable inequalities which call for continued transfer 
of resources in favour of the communal areas.
Table 1 and 2 give a summary overview of the composition of 
revenue of District Councils for 1981/82 and 1984/85 
respectively. From these tables it can be concluded that 
education dwarfs everything else. In 1984/85 it constituted 90% 
of District Council revenue. This not only applies to grant 
revenue which even for 96% are destined for education, but 
increasingly also for local revenue where school fees now 
constitute 60% of total local revenue. In 1981/82 this was only 
31%. A second important conclusion of a comparison of 1981/82 
with 1984/85 figures is that the dependence on central government 
grants has diminished from 90% to 83%. A third observation is 
that the reliance On grant revenue is least in the general 
account (39% is local revenue). Although, it must be said, .the
8relative importance of local revenue has not changed much since 
- 1981/82, despite all debate around the issue.
Table 1
District Councils,Composition of Revenue, by a.ccount, 1981/82 ,
Total General Education Liquor
Local :Rve ■ 11.573.857 3.067.348 3.596.743 4.909.766
Grants 102.527.825 4.660.127 97.867.698
Total 114.101.732 7.727.475 101.464.491 4.909.766
Percentage distribution by source
Local 10 40 4 100Grants 90 60 96 0
Total 100 100 100 100
Percentage distr ibution by account
Local 100 27 31 42Grants 100 4 96 0
Total 100 7 89 4%
Note: Liquor account refers to gross revenue.
Source : MLGRUD, District Council Accounts 1981/82 (unpublished
figures).
Table 2
District Councils,
Composition of Revenue, by account, 1984/85
Total General Education . • Liquor
Local :Rve 44.577.178 6.063.051 27.334.880 11.179.247Grants 216.674.828 9.431.460 207.243.368 -
Total 261.252.006 15.494.511 234.628.248 11.179.247
Percentage distribution by sourceLocal 17 39 12 100Grants 83 61 88 -
Total 100 100 100 100
Percentage distribution by accountLocal, 100 14 61 25Grants 100 4 96 —
Total 100 6 90 4 •
Note: Liquor account refers to gross incomeSource : MLGRUD, District Council Accounts 1984/85
93.2 Experiences of some selected districts
The above analysis is based on aggregate figures which often tend 
to hide a lot of variation in experiences of individual 
districts. It is not easy to capture the complexity of the 
problems without actually descending to the level of individual 
district councils. In order to be able to come up with a picture 
that would mirror the situation for all district councils, a 
random sample was drawn. In such a sample each district has the 
same propability or chance of being selected. Hence there is no 
bias in selection which would influence any results. •• The 
following districts were selected: Batanai, Beitbridge, Buhera, 
Cheziya Gokwe, Chiweshe, Gazaland, Hlangabeza, Mashambazhou, 
Mhondoro, Murewa and Mutoko. Since our main aim is to get an 
overall picture, the names of the individual districts have been 
deleted in the results presented below. What matters is the 
overall picture, not whether district A is' slightly better off 
than B or vice versa.
Table 3
Per Capita Grant and Local Revenue,
Selected Districts, 1981/82 and 1984/85 
(current dollars)
Per Cap. Grant Revenue Per Cap. Local Revenue
1981/82 1984/85 1981/82 1984/85
District 1 16 . 98 46.70 1.00 5.51
District 2 12.33 35.57 0.97 2.69
District 3 17.65 52.79 1.13 8.55
District 4 8.71 41.64 0.81 5.71
District 5 11.30 3 7.26 0.94 5.70
District 6 22.11 53.62 0.80 4.15
District 7 30.12 59.59 3.54 12.84
District 8 24 . 69 41.81 1.00 7.20
District 9 34.01 69.26 3.90 12.04
District 10 25.54 55.28 1.74 10.00 -District 11 ■ 31.89 70.23 3.10 9.41
Mean value 21.39 51.25 1.73 7. 62
Std.Deviation 8 . 67 11.93 1.21 3.24
Coef. Var. 0.40' 0.23 0.70 0.42
Note: based on CSO, prelimenary results of population census of 
1982 and MLGRUD, District Council accounts.
From table 3 a number of important conclusions can be drawn. 
First of all, the inter-district variation in the allocation of 
central government grants is relatively low, though not 
unimportant. Secondly, this variation has gone down over time. A 
third important finding is that there is much greater variation 
among the various districts in capacity to generate local
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revenue. Although also this variation has gone down relatively, 
it is much higher than that for grant revenue. It is important to 
add here that at the height of the 1983-1984 drought the 
inter-district variation went up again (9), only to go down in the last and favourable agricultural season. In other words, 
there are considerable differences between the various districts in ability to raise local revenue. Furthermore, it seems that the 
differences in local fiscal capacity accentuate themselves in 
periods of drought. Lastly, it can . be concluded that central 
allocations in the form of grants help to reduce differences in financial resources between the various districts. Without 
central allocations a potentially clear unequal development of 
districts would be enhanced.
As stressed earlier the education account dwarfs everyting else. 
Since the role of District councils in the case of education is 
mainly to act as a "field office" for central goverment and local 
discretion is limited to the execution of the budget, the picture 
gets somewhat distorted. It is therefore useful to take a closer 
look at the administration department as it is particularly this 
department where District Council "s capacity and responsibility 
is greatest. Table 4 gives a first, impression of fiscal.strength.
Table 4
Relative importance of local revenue in Administration, 
Selected Districts, 1981/82 and 1984/85,
(in percentages)
1981/82 1984/85
District 1 30 60
District 2 50 44
District 3 63 67
District 4 20 51
Distr ict 5 69 70
District 6 57 79District 7 60 74
District 8 52 63
District 9 70 73
District 10 40 32 '
District 11 24 38
Note: calculations based on DC Accounts 1981/82 and 1984/85.
Individual districts have made great strides in raising local 
revenue and are becoming less dependent on the various central 
government.allocations. While it is true that most districts are 
experiencing a decline in grant revenue on the general account as 
a consequence of MLGRUD policy, the main reason for the increase 
in the relative importance of local revenue, are, the efforts of 
the districts to enlarge their local fiscal capacity. As is shown 
in table 4, five of the eleven districts generate more than two 
thirds of the administration budget themselves. In 1981/82 only 
two districts managed to achieve this.
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Table 5 takes a 
revenue. In the 
districts were 
administration 
licences, fees,
closer look at the several sources of local 
fiscal year 1981/82 nine out of the eleven 
dependent for more than half of their
budget on economic taxes such as business 
beer permits and levy, etc. For three districts 
this was even more than 90%. A secondary, but far less important source of local revenue were income generating projects, such as 
the sale of gum poles, etc., but above all liquor profits 
transferred.' In one district income from these projects 
constituted even 70 per cent of local revenue. Only in a few 
instances were other types of revenue of some importance.
Table 5
Composition of local revenue, Administration, by type 
Selected Districts, 1981/82 and 1984/85,
(in percentages)
Rates & Ec .Taxes Service Inc. Gen. OtherDev. Fees & Lies Charges Projects Sources
81/2 84/5 81/2 84/5 81/2 84/5 81/2 84/5 81/2 84/5
District 1 0 0 92 33 3 4 0 46 4 17
District 2 0 15 46 47 0 4 38 7 17 27
District 3 0 2 73 65 0 3 18 13 9 18
Distr ict 4 0 13 94 60 0 1 1 2 4 24
District 5 0 *0 60 79 0 0 0 1 40 19
District 6 0 0 60 75 17 8 17 11 6 7
District 7 0 1 12 15 10 2 70 42 8 40
District 8 0 15 83 67 1 0 1 3 15 15
District 9 0 0 69 75 0 6 28 2 3 17
Distr ict 10 0 0 84 53 7 4 0 42 9 1
District 11 0 5 96 39 0 3 0 1 4 52
Note;: calculations based on DC Accounts 1981/82 and 1984/85
By 1984/85 this situation had changed considerably. Development 
fees have become significant source of revenue for three 
districts. Income generating projects are becoming more important 
also, though some districts are clearly doing better than others. 
Five districts earned significant amounts of revenue from these. 
In most cases these projects are commercial (sale of primary products). Manufacturing projects were only in one instance' 
yielding sizeable revenues. The over-reliance on economic taxes 
diminished accordingly and service charges remained an 
unimportant source of income.
On the whole one may speak of a diversification of sources of 
revenue and this in itself is a positive development. It 
increases the ability of District Councils to withstand better 
financial crisis arising from droughts and recessions.
Despite this measured optimism one should realize that in real
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terms the fiscal capacity of District Councils has not increased so rapidly (disregarding for a moment education and gross liquor 
sales). If one takes into account the growing population and the 
rising costs due to inflation, the real amount of resources increased 3.5% per annum in the period considered. Given the 
growing demands on District Council's capacity to undertake 
development, and the insistence on the part of central government on greater local self-reliance and on reduction of (some) grants, 
the councils may get into a difficult fix, and get caught between 
rising expectations and slow growing resources.
4. Some reflections on District Council fiscal capacity
In the above section we have dealt in some detail with district 
council finance. The analysis presented sofar is however 
incomplete. The financial implications of amalgamation have not 
been discussed. Nor has the role of the DDF in local capital 
formation been analized. The DDF incurred some Z$ 23 min of 
^expenditures in the 1984/85 fiscal year, mostly on roads and 
bridges and water supplies, and all financed from central 
resources. Realizing the incompleteness of our research sofar, it is still usefull to reflect on some issues, albeit in a 
speculative manner and without being able yet to commit these 
reflections to rigorous empirical tests.
Whatever will be the financial implications of amalgamation, it 
should be borne in mind that the per capita income of a communal 
lands household is estimated to be some Z$ 300 (10). Assuming ah 
average household size of six members, this means an average 
income per person of Z$ 50. At the same time, the national per 
capita income of the same year is estimated to be Z$. 418 (11).
Admittedly, these are speculative and inaccurate figures, and 
they can always be criticized. Yet they are indicative of the 
tremendous gap in income (and wealth) between the Communal Areas 
and the rest of the economy. Given this vast inequality, 
continued transfer of income in the form of grants and 
expenditures is a matter of political justice. Furthermore, the 
historically grown imbalances in developmental infrastructure- 
require above average efforts in order for the Communal Areas to 
catch up. With a per capita income which is only one eighth of 
the national average, these extra efforts cannot be self financed 
locally. Self reliance is a laudable goal but history' has given 
it sharp limits. It seems therefore ' unlikely that central 
government transfers will diminish in- importance. The third 
argument for central government allocations is based on the 
observed spatial inequalities between districts. Only through 
central government allocations can real' differences in fiscal 
capacity be evened out. It is important to distinguish here 
between fiscal capacity and fiscal effort. Fiscal capacity may be 
large, yet because of poor administration, low professional 
standard, political opportunism etc, the actual amount of 
revenues raised may be very small. Such situations of poor fiscal
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effort should of course not be enhanced by compensatory central 
allocations.
As stated earlier, any distribution of resources among different 
levels of government can only be judged in relation to the 
reponsibilities each level has. If central government would 
. assume 95% of public expenditures, including all developmental 
functions-, leaving Local Authorities only with regulatory and 
.representative functions, then, there is no great need to raise 
the LA's resource base. If however, the general movement is one 
of decentralization through which District Councils are 
enthrusted with major . development responsibilities, then 
'responsible government' would require a parallel
decentralization of resources. Such fiscal decentralization in no 
way implies that central government would loose considerable 
powers. There are many ways in which central government can
remain on top of the situation and maintain in control of
critical allocation decisions.
Fiscal decentralization can take place in many different forms, 
either through enlarging the local fiscal capacity or through 
central allocations.
Perhaps one of the most serious problem with enlarging local 
fiscal capacity is the weak ability for effectiye local taxation. 
There are several issues at stake here. The administrative and
legal capacity of District Councils generally is weak and needs
to be strengthened. It makes little sense.to introduce new forms, 
of local taxation when recently introduced forms are doing badly. 
The experiences with development fees in some councils is 
illustrative in this respect. The revenue budgeted after 2 years 
of experience with this fee has in some districts gone down to a 
mere fraction of its originally estimated full potential.
Clearly, one does not need draconian colonial measures to 
. convince, people to make their contributions, but only repeated 
requests and pleading may not be a sufficient response to the 
problem. Fortunately, some councils have been able to make 
important improvements which goes to say that many other councils 
can improve their administrative ability for local taxation.
Perhaps the greatest dilemma at this moment in local,- finance is 
"What to tax?". Some alternatives are not really very rnu-ch 
favoured. Such is the case with the development fee (a unit tax), 
not only for reasons of its resemblance to the colonial poll tax, but also because of its regressive incidence. However, in theory 
(though not always in practice) it is easy to collect. ,
A land or land rental tax could have far reaching implications 
for the system of land tenure. These implications go beyond the 
mere question of local revenue. Therefore its introduction would 
require consideration of the wider political economic 
consequences.
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So increasingly, ideas are moving in the direction of a grain 
levy. That is to say, a producer income tax. Speculating about 
this idea, it would in all probability only refer to marketed 
grains and the Grain Marketing Board would then be the most 
obvious collection point. Thus, a council would receive the 
amount of grain tax that is levied on grain sales originating in 
its territory. The most serious drawback of such proposal would 
be the fact that there are quite important inter-district 
variations in grain surplus. Hence, a district in agro-ecological 
zone V would receive only a fraction of the amount received by a 
zone IIB district. Chiweshe or Hurungwe might do well, but what 
about Batanai, .Mudzi or Hwange?
Not only are there grain production variation between district 
council areas but also between these and rural council areas. 
Introducing such a levy would have to await amalgamation so as 
not to reproduce the pre-independence situation whereby black 
farmers paid a surcharge on their marketed grain with which the 
then existing African Development Fund was financed. Such 
situation would clearly discourage small producers/peasants and 
contradict the present rural development policies. '
- JWhile it would obviously be better to introduce such a grain levy 
in time of national grain surpluses, it seems wise to study first 
the distributional consequences of its introduction. Can its 
proceeds be channelled directly back to the respective districts 
or is it necessary to pool all revenues and re-distribute 
according to some 'need formula'? If the latter is to be 
prefered, something that seems likely, how would such 
re-distribution agreement (formula) look like? This matter 
deserves as much attention as the principle itself (12). .
With the introduction of growth points and other -measures to 
stimulate urbanization in the communal areas, and the development 
of infrastructure and public housing, service charges are likely 
to increase in importance, though their aggregate fiscal base can be expected to remain small.. . • -
Income generating projects have received considerable attention 
as means to expand local revenue. However the practice of income 
generating projects is that incomes are generated but mostly not 
for the councils but only for those who are employed in these 
projects. Of course this is a positive aspect in the sense that 
these projects contribute to the creation of employment in rural 
areas, but it also stresses the difficulty of achieving the fiscal objectives. Furthermore, in the case of beer sales, 
councils are faced with contradictory central government 
measures. On the one hand councils are told to generate their own 
revenue and at the same time the price controls on beer have 
turned many profitable^ liquor operations into net ■ losses. 
Although the overall trend in terms of local revenue is not very encouraging there are also cases where districts have made
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The present situation is a system of single purpose and unit cost 
grants (education, administration, health etc.). This system makes 
it difficult for District Councils to develop new initiatives. 
Introducing some form of block grants to be used for different 
purposes, with central government prescription of boundaries, may 
be an alternative that gives the councils greater discretion , and 
initiative.
Tax sharing looks very attractive to many councillors and local administrative officers. For example, if one could get only a 5% 
share of the national taxes on goods and services (these being 
43% of all national tax revenues), then one would have Z$ 57 min 
(13). In other words, this would amount to slightly over Z$ 1 min 
for each council. Surely a handsome sum of money! But as already 
stressed earlier, tax sharing is by no means an easy affair. Why 
should Harava with 28.000 inhabitants, receive as much as Gutu 
wftich has a population of 177.000? Again the crux of the problem 
is not just the principle itself but a fully worked out proposal with a distributional formula that does not ‘have inequitable 
consequences.
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